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The arrest in February 2013 of twenty suspected Congolese rebels, allegedly training 
in South Africa to overthrow Kabila's government,1 carries potent symbolism of the 
vestigial gaps in South Africa's security infrastructure, even as it struggles to find its 
feet in the post-apartheid environment. That the rebels were found training deep in 
the heart of South Africa's Northern Province echoes the painful memory of a 
horrendous past, when the country played host to factions hostile to democratic 
African governments opposed to the apartheid regime.2 It also serves as a reminder 
that South Africa is yet to plug the holes in its security infrastructure, that allow its 
soil to be used by private military and security outfits that have their intentions set 
on causing havoc across the border. Considering that in the recent past there have 
been other incidents of similar pathology, such as the arrest of Mark Thatcher, son 
of the former British Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher, in South Africa for allegedly 
financing a coup plot in Equatorial Guinea,3 and the arrest and subsequent 
imprisonment of Henry Okah, the alleged mastermind of the deadly terrorist bomb 
attack in the Nigerian city of Abuja during the celebration of the 50th year of 
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1  See CNN 2013 edition.cnn.com; SABC 2013 www.sabc.co.za; Staff Reporter 2013 mg.co.za; BBC 
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159; Hanlon 1987 Third World Quarterly 437. 
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independence,4 the conclusion that South Africa is yet to overcome its security 
problems may not be far-fetched. 
 
But just as these events may be unsettling to policy makers and government 
officials, given the prominent role that South Africa plays in continental governance,5 
they have also re-ignited debates on how the country should deal with the new face 
of privatisation in the security industry — the private military and security companies 
(PMSCs). It should be recalled that South Africa was among the first African 
countries to pass a law criminalising mercenary activities — the Prohibition of 
Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in of Armed Conflict Act 
2006.6 The Act, which sought to replace the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance 
Act of 1998 (RFMA),7 represented the government's clearest attempt to rein in 
privateers in the security industry who operate in conflict zones and threaten fragile 
African states. Propelled by political impulse rather than objective assessment, the 
Act merely responded to the need to curb armed activities that went against the 
grain of South Africa's most touted desire to be the kingpin of continental peace and 
security.8 Moreover, the law was based on a policy framework which did not 
envisage the surge on liberalisation in the security sector that we see today. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that the law has remained largely moribund, and questions have 
now arisen as to whether its framework, and indeed that of any other law of its 
pedigree, is suited for dealing with the challenges that the PMSC phenomenon 
currently poses for South Africa and the continent at large.9 
 
We shall be arguing in this article that a weak legal framework, moulded on anti-
mercenary ideology, is unlikely to deal with the manifold problems that arise from 
the operational conduct of PMSCs. A commitment by the government based on a 
                                                 
4  See Gruenbaum 2010 Round Table 585; BBC 2010 news.bbc.co.uk; BBC 2013 news.bbc.co.uk. 
5  See Barker 2005 Int'l Affairs 1079; Jobson 2012 www.guardian.co.uk. 
6  Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in of Armed Conflict Act 26 
of 2006 (hereinafter Mercenary Act). The Act was signed into law by President Mbeki in 2007, 
but it has not come into effect because the rules for its implementation have not yet been 
promulgated. 
7  Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (RFMA). 
8  See Taljaard "Private and Public Security" 83. 
9  See Mesner "Working Towards Effective Legislation" 152. 
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target policy and backed by proper legislative framework, is urgently needed. Thus 
far, the indicators of a robust commitment may be sparse, but glimpses show that 
reform is imminent. That reform, when it arrives, will most likely take a directional 
shift from prohibition to regulation. The most visible indicator yet is the Defence 
Review of 2012,10 which welcomes privatisation in the security industry and, in not 
so many words, recognises the importance of the evolving phenomenon of PMSCs 
and the increasing need for a regulatory framework. In this article we attempt to 
unravel the extent to which the political commitment as evidenced by this policy 
document may influence normative change, and estimate the likelihood of a 
paradigm shift in objectives and priorities towards dealing with private security 
concerns. Our focus is not on the policy document per se, but on how its policy 
imperatives, galvanised by the emerging shift towards regulation rather than 
prohibition, may affect normative development in this area. 
 
We begin our enquiry by feeling our way towards an understanding of what PMSCs 
are, and isolating the reasons why regulations and are necessary. Thereafter, we 
examine the general deficit in South Africa 's normative infrastructure dealing with 
PMSCs and point out why we believe that the Defence Review 2012 enunciates a 
new era in the security reform agenda. We then take a comparative survey of the 
current state of international law relating to PMSCs and illustrate how the emerging 
shift from prohibition to regulation has more than affirmed the need for legislative 
intervention. In this regard, we interrogate whether the evolving policy framework is 
now setting a new agenda for legislative action concomitant with developments at 
the international level. We also question whether there is justification for South 
Africa to remain stuck in the outdated politics of mercenarism, or remain beholden 
to the prohibitionist mantra of the continental bodypolitik, when the prospect of a 
secure South Africa rests with pragmatism and targeted reforms in its security 
infrastructure that go in tandem with dynamic changes at the global level. In 
conclusion, we suggest that more effort should be directed at designing appropriate 
mechanisms for dealing with PMSCs than at putting PMSCs out of business. And 
since the future is on the side of regulation, not prohibition, legislation that furthers 
                                                 
10  Department of Defence 2012 www.info.gov.za (hereinafter Defence Review). 
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the policy agenda envisioned by the Defence Review may be the best tool to unlock 
the inhibitions of the past and to align South Africa's security aspirations with those 
of the rest of the world. 
 
2 PMSCs: What are they? 
 
There is consensus that PMSCs should be distinguished from mercenaries, even 
though their operations may occasionally overlap.11 PMSCs are essentially well-
organised and registered corporations that offer private military and general security 
services for hire. They are supposed to be civilian organisations although their work 
may be difficult to categorise. Some of them offer services that are coercive in 
nature, such as combat, guarding and protection, interrogation and detention.12 
Whilst performing such tasks, these PMSCs are expected to follow military rules and 
practices, and to adopt military codes in the same manner as national armies. 
Whether or not they remain civilians and should be treated as such by law has been 
the subject of a protracted debate.13 On the other hand, there are PMSCs that offer 
non-coercive services, even though they operate within a military setting. Such 'non-
coercive' services may include logistical support, weapons maintenance, sanitation, 
laundry services to missions, and the movement of military personnel.14 No matter 
the nature of the services PMSCs provide, war is a business opportunity for all of 
them. Armed conflicts, political instability and collapsed security situations in 
politically troubled states are, beyond any doubt, their richest source of lucre. For 
this reason, their involvement in a conflict situation is often viewed with suspicion, 
especially because their motivation may simply be to make money and support their 
benefactor irrespective of the morality of the cause. This apart, because of the 
nature of their work, PMSCs' operations are often transnational in character and 
beyond the scope of the regulatory systems in any one single state. For this reason 
PMSCs are ordinarily less constrained in taking advantage of collapsed legal, political 
                                                 
11  See eg Salzman 2008 NYUJ Int'l L & Pol 853; Juma "Mercenarism" 197; Brooks 2007 JIPO 4. 
12  See Hoppe 2008 EJIL 1006. 
13  See eg Davidson 2000 Pub Cont LJ; Schmitt 2005 Chi J Int'l L; Jackson 2007 J Nat'l Ass'n Admin 
L Judiciary 35. 
14  See eg Defence Review para 47b. 
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and security systems of the hiring state, and consequently more likely to commit 
serious violations and abuses in the pursuit of their objectives. 
 
Despite their international focus, PMSCs are often registered as business entities 
under the domestic corporate laws of their home states. Such registration essentially 
grants them corporate legal personality, meaning they can sue or be sued and their 
activities have to be in compliance with the domestic corporate laws of their home 
states. Notwithstanding, states face constraints in their efforts to effectively monitor 
and control the extra-territorial activities of PMSCs registered under national law. 
These extra-territorial activities are often but not always on the basis of contracts 
with foreign governments, regimes and armed opposition groups for the provision of 
their services in return for profit. Since such contracts are ordinarily not subject to 
the laws of the home states of the PMSCs, it is difficult to use this domestic law to 
determine the legal validity of the ensuing legal contractual relationships, and the 
nature of services that should be performed in foreign countries. So even with the 
best intentions, home states may face considerable difficulty in regulating the 
activities of PMSCs. 
 
PMSCs also hire out their services to non-state actors15 and weak and fragile 
governments in transition following periods of war or political instability.16 
Regrettably, a substantial volume of PMSCs' activities is conducted through informal 
and discrete arrangements, facilitated by international private corporations, private 
military networks, arms brokers and third-party agents present in the conflict state 
and neighbouring states. These other 'partners' are also crucial in logistics, planning 
and preparation, as well as in the acquisition, transportation and deployment of 
materials necessary in the performance of their contractual responsibilities. In such 
situations there could be multiple entities and individuals with no proper chain of 
command involved in operations carried out by PMSCs. For this reason, 
accountability for human rights violations may be very difficult to enforce.17 In 
addition, PMSCs may pose a risk to state security when their renegade employees 
                                                 
15  See Abrahamsen and William 2007 Int'l Relations 237. 
16  See Cilliers and Cornwell 1999 ASR 31-42. 
17  See eg Amann 2005 U Pa L Rev 2085; Raghavan and White 2007 www.washingtonpost.com. 
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forge links with organised crime syndicates and bands of rebel soldiers who survive 
on the ruthless and illegal extraction of natural resources.18 In situations of conflict 
these entities could contribute to the prolonging of the conflict and become a 
greater hindrance to peace. These problems are further aggravated by inchoate and 
sometimes minimal regulatory mechanisms in their home countries.19 So, while 
PMSCs' operatives may incur criminal and civil liability for violation of human rights 
and international humanitarian law on a theoretical level, in reality prosecutions are 
very rare. 
 
In the light of the nature of the PMSCs profession, and because their services are 
discharged in particularly hostile security environments, PMSCs have to rely on 
former military personnel, to a significant extent, to provide their services.20 This is 
borne out by the number of South African PMSCs, and their counterparts abroad, 
that have recruited former apartheid military officers and personnel after the fall of 
apartheid.21 A 2005 report estimated that there were about 5,000 to 10,000 South 
Africans working for PMSCs in Iraq.22 Undoubtedly, therefore, South Africa has a 
greater interest than most other African countries, in regulating their PMSC industry. 
But as South Africa responds to this need, there will always be a dilemma: treating 
PMSCs like any other corporate entities that enjoy freedom of contract with parties 
of their choosing might endanger domestic, regional and continental security and 
damage South Africa's international relations and foreign policy. On the other hand, 
limiting the legal rights of PMSCs to contract should be done carefully to ensure that 
such restrictions comply with the country's constitutional and legal framework.23 This 
dilemma compels an enquiry into how South Africa should deal with the PMSC 
question. 
 
                                                 
18  McIntyre 2004 ASR 101. 
19  See Prado 2011 BJWA 153. 
20  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 76. 
21  See Lock "Africa, Military Downsizing" 12. 
22  See Clarno and Vally 2005 www.corpwatch.org. 
23  Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides: "Every citizen has 
the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, 
occupation or profession may be regulated by law. " 
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3 South Africa's response to the PMSCs problematique 
 
Since the defeat of apartheid, genuine attempts have been made to reform the 
security sector while prioritising the protection of individual rights and freedoms, 
human security and the democratisation project. As far as privatisation in the 
security sector is concerned, the challenge was seen, initially, to be that of 
harnessing the wayward security apparatuses scuttled after the overthrow of the 
apartheid regime, so that they didn't portend harm to other African states. In the 
recent past, however, the concerns have escalated as the private players in the 
sector have metamorphosed into corporate organisations with transnational appeal. 
However, and as we shall demonstrate in the latter part of this article, the policies 
and norms put in place to deal with this challenge have remained largely reactionary 
and tepid. The laws that have been passed thus far have tended to focus on 
prohibition rather than regulation, are inflexible, and are therefore unable to 
accommodate change in the security sector. 
 
Before we discuss these norms in reasonable detail it may be worthwhile to give a 
broader overview of the policy instruments that have responded to the defence and 
security needs of South Africa as it sought to consolidate its democracy and 
entrench its hold on continental power politics. In the period following the 1994 
democratic elections the government adopted two important policy documents that 
defined its future security reform agenda: the 1996 White Paper on Defence24 and 
the 1999 White Paper on Defence Related Industries.25 These two policy instruments 
cover considerable ground but with minimal differences mainly dictated by their 
temporal contexts. Presumably, and generally speaking, the 1996 White Paper was 
aimed at dismantling the apartheid system, while the 1999 one was an attempt to 
build an authentic security infrastructure that was consistent with South Africa's 
emerging role as a continental leader. Given the limited space, we shall attempt to 
set out only some generalities in the reform trajectory expressed by these two 
papers that are relevant to our subject. Primarily, both instruments adopt a very 
                                                 
24  See White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996). 
25  See White Paper on South Africa Defence Related Industries (1999). 
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wide interpretation of national security that includes aspirations for democratic 
consolidation, social justice, economic development, human rights, and even political 
stability. They also put great emphasis on the reform of public institutions, mainly 
the South African Defence Forces (SADF). They are couched in transformative lingo, 
but with scant details on how their objectives are to be achieved. Hidden in the 
details are their affirmation of the role of international law in dealing with security 
issues. This has had a critical importance to security reform because it indicated, 
from the very beginning, the willingness of the new South Africa to be bound by 
international treaties and Conventions. Obviously, therefore, the policy imperatives 
embodied in the two papers paved the way for the domestication of international 
standards in South Africa. 
 
Notwithstanding the broader focus of these policies, their key objective remained 
"the political transition from apartheid to a democratic South Africa and the 
concomitant integration of diverse statutory and non-statutory armed forces into a 
single Defence Force."26 A key factor in this transitional agenda was thought to be 
the demobilization and rationalization of the defence forces. Although these 
processes were to be carried out in accordance with the principles of fair labour 
practices, transparency, equality, and with due regard to the need to retain expert 
personnel, they effectively reduced the number of trained white military personnel in 
the force. No wonder a great number of qualified white personnel were rendered 
jobless or voluntarily left the force. Many of such personnel later provided a pool of 
expert military labour that fueled the growth of the private military and security 
industry in South Africa. Thus, although the two policies did not mention 
mercenaries or private security organizations, the processes which they engendered 
directly resulted in the proliferation of such entities. A mercenary outfit such as the 
defunct Executive Outcomes that was involved in the Sierra Leone conflict was 
formed by ex-SADF soldiers.27 The current crop of PMSCs based in South Africa such 
as Bridge Resources International, Corporate Trading International, Erinys 
                                                 
26  See ch 1, para 6 Defence Review. 
27  For detailed discussion of the origins of Executive Outcomes, see Barlow Executive Outcomes. 
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International and even Falconer Systems, have equally benefitted from the 
downsizing of the SADF.28 
 
Produced at the time when South Africa was asserting itself as the power broker in 
continental affairs, the drafters of these policy instruments must have been aware of 
the political aversion to mercenarism among the African states. Indeed, African 
states had made their position clear by adopting the 1977 Mercenary Convention.29 
Although moribund in many respects, the convention represented a wide consensus 
on the undesirability of private military entities operating in the continent. Further, 
its prohibitionist approach was evident in almost all deliberations on continental 
security and massively influenced the tone of normative developments at the 
domestic level. Given the urgency with which South Africa sought to entrench itself 
in continental affairs, its support of the prohibitionist approach was neither 
interrogated nor debated at the time when it enacted its domestic laws dealing with 
mercenaries, such as the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act and the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act. 
 
Clearly, contemporary developments in the global security landscape necessitate a 
constant review of policies and normative frameworks relating to PMSCs. Thus, 
domestic law and policy can have meaningful impact when aligned to evolving 
trends. It is for this reason that we suggest in this paper that South Africa must 
consider enacting law regarding security to keep up with the momentum of change. 
The policy instruments we mentioned earlier predate the critical developments in 
defence and private military security and cannot move South Africa forward as it 
seeks to assert its role as a major player in continental security affairs. The shift 
from the familiar mould of prohibition to the more progressive path of regulation 
that is evident in the Defence Review 2012 is thus to be welcomed. Before we 
examine how the policy imperatives in this new document may impact on the 
                                                 
28  See Kinsey Corporate Soldiers 5. 
29  OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1972). For a discussion of the 
shortcomings of the Convention, see Abrahams "Contemporary Legal Environment" 81. 
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evolution of norms, it might be useful to survey existing normative terrain and 
identify some of the shortcomings that legitimise the call for a revised approach. 
 
3.1 The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 
 
Currently the major domestic piece of legislation dealing with mercenaries and 
private security companies is the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation 
of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act (the Mercenary Act).30 The Act 
was signed into law by President Thabo Mbeki in November 2007.31 It embodies 
what we characterise as South Africa's prohibitionist approach to private security. 
Among other objectives, this Act seeks to "prohibit mercenary activity; to regulate 
the provision of assistance or service of a military or military-related nature in a 
country of armed conflict; to regulate the enlistment of South African citizens or 
permanent residents in other armed forces; to regulate the provision of 
humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict; to provide for extra-territorial 
jurisdiction for the courts of the Republic with regard to certain offences; to provide 
for offences and penalties".32 From these objectives, the Act constructs a two-
pronged prohibitionist framework. First, it criminalises all acts that are deemed 
mercenary in nature.33 These acts include the "direct or indirect recruitment, use, 
training or support of combatants in armed conflicts." It also prohibits the 
negotiating or offering assistance (including rendering service) to an armed conflict 
or regulated country; providing any assistance or rendering any service to a party to 
an armed conflict or regulated area; recruiting, using, training, supporting or 
financing a person to provide or render any service to a party to an armed conflict or 
regulated area; and performing any other act that has the result of furthering the 
                                                 
30  Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed 
Conflict Act 27 of 2006. This Act repealed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 
1998. In terms of its long title, the RFMA was aimed at regulating "the rendering of foreign 
military assistance by South African juristic persons, citizens, persons permanently resident 
within South Africa and foreign citizens rendering such assistance within the borders of South 
Africa". For the discussion on RFMA, see Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 75. 
31  See Ahmadou and Gumedze 2008 www.iss.co.za. 
32  See the Preamble of the Mercenary Act. 
33  Section 2 of the Mercenary Act. 
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military interests of a party to an armed conflict or in a "regulated country".34 
Interestingly, and in furtherance of its prohibitionist posture, the Act adopts some of 
the elements of definition of a mercenary found in regional and international 
instruments such as the "object of private gain; the participation, directly or 
indirectly in acts aimed at furthering armed conflicts; instigating or supporting 
rebellion against legitimate governments, coup d'etat and the undermining of 
constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states".35 
 
Secondly, it seeks to exercise control over persons or companies or individuals that 
may legitimately engage in such activities abroad by establishing a licensing process. 
Thus, a major aspect of this Act is the requirement for the registration of private 
security entities by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee established 
under the National Conventional Arms Control Act.36 In addition to this, the Act has 
extra-territorial application: it regulates the activities of South African registered 
private military security companies in foreign lands. So, while under sections 3, 4, 
and 5 the Act prohibits the rendering of assistance and certain services, the 
enlistment of South Africans in armed forces other than the South African Defence 
Force, and the provision of humanitarian services in countries where there is an 
armed conflict or in a regulated country, persons seeking to perform or participate in 
such acts may apply for authorization through a procedure set out in section 7.37 
The Act retains the functions of the National Arms Control Committee as the 
authorisation body. Interestingly, one of the extra-territorial components of the Act 
(section 11) is that acts committed outside South Africa by South African companies, 
citizens or permanent citizens may be tried as though they were committed in South 
Africa.38 In essence, this means that a violation of the law by these entities outside 
South Africa's borders subjects them to the jurisdiction of South Africa's legal 
system. This would be in addition to the jurisdiction exercisable by any other 
affected state under either the domestic law of such a state or international law. 
 
                                                 
34  Juma "Mercenarism" 218. 
35  Juma "Mercenarism" 218. 
36  National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002. 
37  See Juma "Mercenarism" 219. 
38  Juma "Mercenarism" 219. 
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In general terms, however, the legal framework created by this Act is more 
prohibitive than regulative; it harshly frowns upon private military securitisation and 
mercenarism. Such a hostile approach to the private military industry in South Africa 
might have been justified by general suspicion and distrust of these entities in Africa 
at the time this law was promulgated. But times have changed and many of the 
challenges that South Africa faces also create opportunities that must be urgently 
seized by the government. South Africa needs to overcome its ambivalence to 
market-oriented approaches to security and deal with the smugness and lassitude 
inherent in its security reform agenda. Apartheid and the struggles to overcome it 
may have created apathy towards neo-liberal tendencies, but the reality of global 
security and the economic opportunities that privatisation in the sector presents 
have made it inevitable for the independent South Africa to shift its policy. In our 
view, the shift has become evident in the recently promulgated Defence Review of 
2012. The question, however, is how this indicator may nudge normative 
development towards embracing the liberal trends in private security regulation. 
Moreover, the fact that the document is merely a draft inevitably triggers debate on 
whether the final policy document will accommodate the imperatives of global 
change in private security regulation. 
 
3.2 Draft South African Defence Review (2012) 
 
As already said, the government produced two policies before 2012, the 1996 White 
Paper on Defence and the 1999 White Paper on Defence Related Industries. In the 
recent past these two policies have become punch-bags for their critical 
shortcomings in failing to meet contemporary challenges in the defence and security 
sectors. The need to constantly review official policies and the debates generated by 
mercenary and private military and security acts on South Africa's soil necessitated 
the formulation of a new policy framework to supplant these two official documents. 
On 12 April 2012, the South African Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans 
published a draft South African Defence Review 2012 (hereinafter the Defence 
Review) for the purposes of public engagement and debate. The Defence Review is 
essentially a tentative document aimed at the formulation, development and 
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implementation of a new strategy and policy for South Africa's defence. The 
eventual aim is to replace the current defence policy with a new policy framework 
that appropriately incorporates contemporary practices, strategies and approaches in 
defence and security whilst simultaneously responding to major developments in the 
global defence environment. Accordingly, the Review covers vast areas related to 
national defence and security, most of which do not fall within the purview of this 
discussion. 
 
As regards PMSCs, the Defence Review justifies the need for a renewed debate on 
the role of private players in the security sector, given that a number of "South 
African private security companies continue to be contracted by foreign countries to 
operate in conflict zones, usually protecting prominent individuals, critical 
infrastructure, property and strategic resources".39 The review envisions the debate 
being extended to the nature of the relationships such companies could have with 
former and currently active members of the South African National Defence Forces 
as well as other state armies and governments in Africa and beyond. Further, the 
review predicts that "the global involvement of South African private security 
companies or South African citizens, particularly in defence transformation, 
peacekeeping and peace building in conflict and post-conflict areas will continue into 
the foreseeable future."40 This statement constitutes an important official admission 
of the increasing involvement of South African corporate private military security 
entities in conflict zones. It can be argued that the fact that the Defence Review 
identifies the issue of mercenarism and private military security as pressing concerns 
suggests that there is need for their effective regulation. The Defence Review 
therefore predicates the need for intellectual debate on policy and normative change 
contemporaneous with developments in defence and security in South Africa and 
across the globe. 
 
We have suggested that the Review indicates a shift in South Africa's policy on 
private security that accommodates regulation rather than prohibition. As a matter 
                                                 
39  See ch 3, para 48 Defence Review. 
40  Chapter 3, para 48 Defence Review. 
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of critical importance the Review, first of all, acknowledges the difference between 
mercenaries and PMSCs, although it fails to describe each category satisfactorily. 
The benefit of making the distinction is obvious — it paves the way for dealing with 
PMSCs as distinct phenomena, thereby allowing South Africa to establish regulatory 
frameworks that do not disturb the regional and international regimes that 
criminalise mercenary activities. Undoubtedly there are many private entities 
operating in African conflict zones whose activities are questionable. Such entities 
violate domestic as well as international law in several respects and must be dealt 
with severely. Thus, the distinction needs to be much clearer and should, if possible, 
go down to the demarcation of the activities of an entity's personnel and the 
services it provides.41 The controls must be stricter if the entity will be operating in a 
conflict zone or providing military services. This implies that there should be a 
distinction even among the PMSCs themselves. Apart from the foregoing, the 
distinction in the Defence Review is welcome because it opens up a new perspective 
on the way South Africa and perhaps Africa at large should view the role of private 
entities in boosting their security needs. 
 
Apart from acknowledging the distinct nature of PMSCs, the Defence Review points 
to the needs for normative intervention. It suggests that existing policy priorities and 
the legal regulatory framework might need to be upgraded in order to properly 
capture evolving and contemporary developments in this sector. Indeed, South 
Africa might need to respond to this call by urgently establishing a normative 
framework to regulate its burgeoning private security sector. This being the case, it 
may be useful to examine how developments at the international level that affirms 
the global commitment towards the regulation of PMSCs might influence such an 
endeavour. 
 
                                                 
41  In international humanitarian law the distinction falls on legal status – whether PMSC personnel 
should be regarded as civilians or combatants. Ideally they should be civilians and not 
combatants. Thus, when they directly participate in combat, they lose their civilian status. IHL 
has developed complex guidelines on determining "direct participation". See ICRC 2009 
www.icrc.org 872-991. 
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4 Changes in the global arena 
 
In this section we examine international developments that signify a change of 
attitude towards the privatisation of security and the willingness to accommodate 
regulation rather than prohibition. We posit three trends that manifest this change. 
The first encapsulates the efforts within the United Nations to develop a multilateral 
treaty specifically dealing with PMSCs, while maintaining the legitimacy of the anti-
mercenary laws. These efforts are mainly resident within the UN Working Group on 
the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the 
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination (the 'Working Group').42 The 
centrepiece of these efforts is the recent promulgation of the Draft Convention on 
Regulation Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies.43 
Secondly, change patterns are explicit in the plethora of soft-law instruments crafted 
through collaborative efforts of governments and regional power blocks as well as 
leading stakeholders in the private security industries. We single out for discussion 
the Montreux Document,44 produced in 2008 and largely regarded as a template for 
acceptable practices in engaging and monitoring the services of PMSCs.45 Thirdly, 
the ascendancy of self-regulatory frameworks into mainstream discourse on PMSC 
regulation cannot be ignored. Regional and national associations formed by PMSCs 
have developed codes of conduct that govern the activities of their members. In as 
much as these codes were initially meant to steer the discourse away from the 
dreaded subject of mercenarism and cushion the industry against regulatory 
overreach, they provide the moral tenor that has galvanised the evolving shift in 
perceptions and attitudes towards PMSCs. In fact, it is through these associations 
that we have witnessed the strongest claims to the differentiation which exists 
between mercenarism and PMSCs. 
 
                                                 
42  HRC Res 2005/2. The activities of the Working Group are posted on their web page (UN OHCHR 
Date Unknown www.ohchr.or). 
43  UN 2009 mgimo.ru (hereinafter the Draft Convention). 
44  See Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for 
States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, 
Annex, addressed to the Secretary General (2008) (Montereux Document). 
45  For an in-depth discussion of the Document, see Cockayne 2009 JCSL 401. 
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It may be worthwhile to mention that the trends above do not complement each 
other: they exist in separate worlds despite targeting similar problems. And that, all 
along, has been the main inhibitor to the establishment an international regime for 
the regulation of PMSCs. The UN Working Group process eschews the self-regulatory 
mechanisms and views them as being sympathetic to camouflaged forms of 
mercenarism.46 On the other hand, proponents of the Montreux Document are 
equally ambivalent to the Working Group process and its efforts to establish a 
binding multilateral framework for PMSCs. For our purpose, however, these trends 
illustrate the shift in thinking around PMSC regulation and may very well provide 
ample lessons for developing domestic policy and law. Let us examine in a more 
substantive way how these trends play out in the context of normative change 
regarding PMSCs. 
 
4.1 Normative developments prior to 2005 
 
Few may dispute the fact that normative development at the international level is 
slow and often belated. Likewise, the values which spur normative change take time 
to garner enough probity among the divergent political constituencies that make up 
the international community. This explains why international treaties have a long 
gestation period. The challenges of building consensus are numerous, as is the 
complexity of generating an acceptable normative framework even on subjects that 
are not disputed. As far as security goes, the wheels turn even slower. When the 
United Nations adopted the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries (the UN Mercenary Convention) in 1989,47 it 
was because African states were able to build a consensus around the need to 
protect their democracies from the threat of mercenarism.48 Indeed, the same 
African states had signified their commitment to similar values by adopting their own 
                                                 
46  See eg the Report of the Working Group on Mercenaries (HRC 2007) para 36 (noting the human 
rights violations committed by PMSCs in Iraq). 
47  International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 
(1989) (UN Mercenary Convention). The Convention did not come into force until 2001 when 
Costa Rica acceded to it. Currently, the Convention has only 28 ratifications and nobody has ever 
been prosecuted under its regime. 
48  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 75. 
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version of a mercenary convention way back in 1977.49 Beyond the African 
continent, a commitment of this nature had already been made by the international 
community even before the African Mercenary Convention was passed. In 1968, the 
UN General Assembly had adopted a resolution which declared the practice of using 
mercenaries an offence.50 Two years later the Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States, which imposed on states the "duty to refrain from organising armed 
groups, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state".51 
These developments were consistent with the prevailing ideology of prohibition and 
helped shape the norms that evolved thereafter. 
 
By adopting the Convention, the international community made a statement about 
values which they considered important to their co-operative project of maintaining 
international peace and security. Given that mercenary activities were regarded as 
forms of violence and a threat to international peace and security, the Convention 
was seen to fulfil an important international function. Its scheme effectively 
outlawed such activities and enjoined states to ensure that their territories were not 
used to perpetrate any acts of its kind.52 It went even further and forbade the 
recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries.53 Although the Convention 
could not come up with an accurate definition of a mercenary, so as to demarcate 
the precise contours of the prohibition regime it established,54 this did not suggest 
any derogation from the values it sought to protect or any ambiguity in the intention 
of states sponsoring it. It merely pointed to the complexity of the mercenary 
question and the contradictions within the neo-liberal frame when it comes to 
security and profits. 
 
                                                 
49  See Gumedze 2007 ASR 22; Fallah 2006 IRRC 599. 
50  Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples UNGA Res 2465, 23UN GAOR Supp (No 18) at 4 UN Doc A/1218 (1968) (UN GA Res 
2625). 
51  UN GA Res 2625. 
52  See Juma "Mercenarism" 209 (discussing a 10 of the Convention). 
53  Article 5 of the UN Mercenary Convention. 
54  Article 5 of the UN Mercenary Convention; Desai 2005 USFL Rev 825. 
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The Convention's prohibitionist approach was undoubtedly a spirited reaction to the 
ambivalence towards privatisation in the security sector that was prevalent at the 
time. Indeed, the threat that mercenarism and other private security or military 
outfits were seen to pose to the universal values of peace had for a long time 
appeared genuine and understandable. However, significant changes in the 
international normative order, which have occurred in the past decade, seem to 
indicate that the value system is also changing. Evidently, the international 
community is gradually accommodating the changes brought about by globalisation 
and the free market in its approach to maintaining international peace and security. 
Concomitant with these changes has been the community's growing affinity to 
security options and methods of deployment that are less hostile or ambivalent to 
private actors. Powerful nations as well as regional organisations have ratcheted up 
their use of PMSCs, forcing the tide to rise in favour of increasing privatisation in 
military projects, despite international norms. For example, the African Union, a 
major proponent of the anti-mercenary crusade, has itself used PMSCs in several 
peace projects.55 For this reason, earlier laws such as the UN Mercenary Convention, 
the Geneva Conventions56 and even the rules of customary law57that had entrenched 
the international distaste of mercenary activity and decreed against the involvement 
of private entities in war are coming under severe strain.58 Indeed, the anti-
mercenary crusade which the international community had bound itself to when the 
Mercenary Convention and other instruments were passed is dissipating as PMSCs 
gain more acceptance.59 These developments have entrenched the difference 
between mercenarism and PMSCs, thus minimising the focus on anti-mercenary law. 
As one scholar argues, the distinction has "created a discursive opportunity for the 
                                                 
55  The AU's peace operations in Sudan were supported by Pacific A & E and Medical Solutions, 
which provided transport and logistical communication services. See Pattinson 2010 Int'l Theory 
9. For a complete discussion of the role of PMSCs in African Union operations, see Holmqvist 
Private Security Companies 50. See also Spearin 2011 Int'l Peacekeeping 196. 
56  See eg a 47 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949 and Relating to 
the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1979) (Additional Protocol I), 
which denied the benefit of prisoner of war status to mercenaries. This article crafted the first 
definition of mercenary that was adopted in all subsequent regional and international treaties. 
See also UN GA Res 2625 approving the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
57  See Percy Mercenaries 216. 
58  See Shearer Private Armies 16. 
59  See eg Ebrahim 2010 BU Int'l LJ 210. 
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development of new international regulations that endorse the legality and 
legitimacy of contracted business and their employees using armed force in regions 
of conflict."60 Added to this evolving phenomenon is the fact that the anti-mercenary 
laws are grossly ineffective. Just about 30 states have ratified the UN Mercenary 
Convention,61 signifying the lack of interest in the prohibitionist approach. 
Furthermore, none of these laws have clear definitions of who a mercenary is, and 
they are completely opaque to the corporate organisational structure that private 
entities have assumed in the recent past. Thus, they are unhelpful when it comes to 
dealing with PMSCs. These drawbacks, complemented by the proliferation of PMSCs 
all across the globe, more than underscore the need for new regulatory 
frameworks.62 Let us now examine how the international community has responded 
to this need, by analysing the trends that we mentioned earlier. 
 
4.2  The Draft International Convention on the Regulation Oversight and 
Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies 
 
As we have already intimated, the prohibitionist thinking prevailed in the United 
Nations for just about two decades. Up until 2005, when the UN Working Group was 
constituted, the ruling idea was that of prohibition. But the Working Group has 
charted a new course, coming up with a draft law which acknowledges the role of 
PMSCs and embodies the principles of regulation. This proposed draft law marks a 
turning point in the UN's approach to the PMSCs question. It affirms the legality of 
PMSCs, as opposed to mercenaries, and establishes a scheme for distinguishing 
prohibited mercenary activities from the permissible activities of PMSCs, while 
directing the attention of the international community to the need to eliminate 
conditions that allow violations of human rights by PMSCs and their personnel to go 
unpunished. The Draft Convention deals with important aspects of what one might 
regard as modern PMSCs law such as state responsibility, the obligations of 
international humanitarian law, the criminality of certain acts, human rights, and the 
establishment of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. Since these issues have 
                                                 
60  Krahmann 2011 Millenn J Int Stud 345. 
61  See Gichanga Fusing Privatisation 2. 
62  See Mehra 2009-2010 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 327. 
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been dealt with elaborately in several studies,63 our interest here is limited to the 
illustration of how this initiative changes the global perspective regarding the 
regulation of PMSCs. 
 
Perhaps the place to begin in the analysis of this law is what it claims to be its 
purpose. It is here that the tone for regulation is set and a clear break from the 
prohibitionist approach can be discerned. The Convention outlines its main objective 
to be the need to fill the "important gaps…in national and international legal regimes 
applicable to private military and security companies".64 Further, the Convention 
outlines key factors and conditions necessary for the establishment of a robust 
regulatory framework. These include the creation of  a regulatory framework that 
would ensure that PMSCs observe international humanitarian and human rights law; 
establishing systems of regulation that target, not only the conduct of PMSCs, but 
their relationship with states as well; demarcating roles and functions so that PMSCs 
do not undertake functions that fall within the exclusive competence of states; 
harmonising the full breadth of international instruments that have a bearing on 
PMSCs; and setting agreeable legal standards for the regulation of PMSCs.65 
 
The Draft Convention then proceeds to establish rules regulating the relationship 
between states and PMSCs and minimum standards for the activities of these 
companies. A wide range of issues is dealt with, including what constitutes inherent 
government functions and the notion of direct participation in hostilities; prohibited 
activities and the role of states in this regard; state responsibility; and the notion of 
effective remedy. Its rules also create supervisory mechanisms at the international 
as well as national levels. In this regard, it proposes the establishment of an 
oversight committee which will not only receive and review reports on the 
implementation of the Convention,66 but also conduct enquiries upon receiving 
                                                 
63  See eg Prado 2012 Criminal Justice Ethics 262; Prado 2008 JC & SL 429; Juma 2011 Law 
Democracy & Development 182; White 2011 Hum Rts Rev 133. 
64  Preamble, para 21 of the Draft Convention. 
65  See Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 188. See also aa 2, 7, 11 and 23 of the Draft 
Convention. 
66  Article 33 of the Draft Convention. 
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reliable information of "grave and systematic violations" of the Convention.67 In 
addition, it establishes an individual or group complaint procedure similar to those in 
human rights treaties.68 At the centre of its regulatory scheme are states. They are 
required to take "legislative, administrative and other measures as may be necessary 
to ensure that PMSCs and their personnel are held accountable for violations of 
applicable national and international law".69 Further, a state is enjoined to "establish 
comprehensive domestic regimes for regulation and oversight over activities in its 
territory of PMSCs and their personnel, in order to prohibit and investigate illegal 
activities as defined by this Convention as well as by relevant national law".70This 
obviously has implications for states such as South Africa that are still holding to the 
prohibitionist approach, calling on them to switch gears and begin to accommodate 
PMSCs in their policy and legislative responses to security concerns. 
 
The other aspect that might be of interest is the fact that whereas the draft law 
affirms the commitment of the international community to the UN Mercenary 
Convention in the Preamble, its approach to PMSCs regulation belies such a 
commitment. This is revealed by the manner in which it deals with activities that 
would ordinarily be mercenary in nature if performed by private entities and not the 
state.71 These activities are described as "unlawful activities" and not mercenary 
acts.72 In fact, the word mercenary is avoided completely. Even where the Draft 
Convention expressly prohibits the use of force by PMSCs to overthrow governments 
or to violate state sovereignty,73 an act which for a long time has been the hallmark 
of mercenary involvement in Africa, no reference is made to the existing prohibition 
frameworks. The only plausible explanation is that the drafters intended to subtly 
embrace the distinction that state practice has drawn between mercenaries and 
PMSCs. And by doing so, the drafters may have hoped to convey the message that 
the prohibitionist approaches of yesteryears weren't obsolete but remain directed at 
                                                 
67  Article 35 of the Draft Convention. 
68  Article 34 of the Draft Convention. 
69  Article 5 of the Draft Convention. 
70  Article 12(1)(a) of the Draft Convention. 
71  Article 2 of the Draft Convention. See also, White 2011 Hum Rts Rev 138 (suggesting that 
limiting some activities only to states may be problematic for advocates of the free market). 
72  Article 2 of the Draft Convention. 
73  Article 8(1) (a)-(d) of the Draft Convention. 
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mercenaries and not PMSCs. The difficulty here is that an entity that commits these 
wrongful acts is still classified as a PMSC and not a mercenary, thus blurring the 
distinction. Moreover, the upshot of this approach is to diminish the relevance of 
"mercenary" as a term in security discourse. 
 
There is no doubt that the UN efforts to establish a binding international framework 
should be supported. Moreover, considering that the involvement of PMSCs in 
international duties, such as peacekeeping, is set to increase rather than decrease, 
the preference for a binding multilateral regime cannot be overstated.74 Therefore, 
even as we advocate for national laws we are conscious that a domestic regime can 
be most effective if it is based on international standards. Moreover, most PMSCs are 
transnational organisations and their operations span the globe. Because of this 
spread and the fact that they may forge different kinds of relationships with states, 
fragmented approaches to their regulation inevitably lessen accountability and 
diminish the effect of law. For example, it may be difficult at times to ascertain the 
difference between a "sending state" and a "host state" for the purposes of 
apportioning responsibility.75 Also, regulations in one state cannot constrain PMSC 
operations in another state. These apart, the PMSC phenomenon feeds into the 
perennial problem of establishing accountability for multinational corporations under 
international law. The dominance of multinational corporations in our present world 
is indisputable. But their operations do not always yield benefits, and accountability 
remains a problem. Some organisations see this as a problem that requires 
international normative intervention. The UNDP, for example, has suggested that 
accountability may be established if multinationals are brought "within the 
framework of global governance, not just a patchwork of national law rules or 
regulations".76 We accept this broad analysis but doubt if it can deliver on 
enforcement. So, while we agree that to fully regulate PMSCs an international 
framework should be in place, domestic mechanism are still needed to complement 
it and give it the necessary enforcement edge. This is recognised by the Draft 
Convention, which enjoins states to pass domestic law that confers the jurisdiction 
                                                 
74  See Gichanga Fusing Privatisation 6. 
75  See Cockayne 2009 JCSL 401. 
76  UNDP 1999 100, cited in Mehra 2009-2010 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 332. 
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to oversee the operations of PMSCs taking place within their territories on national 
structures.77 Moreover, failure to enact a domestic law creates an accountability gap 
that will only allow for impunity to go unpunished. 
 
4.3 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and 
Good Practices for States Related to the Operation of Private 
Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict 
 
The Montreux Document represents one of the most significant efforts to establish a 
non-binding but widely respected regime for the regulation of PMSCs. It was 
developed by the efforts of both the Swiss government and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) through what was dubbed the 'Swiss Initiative'. 
The initiative was technically a consultative process involving governments, the 
PMSCs and the civil society in seeking a regulatory framework for PMSCs by 
clarifying their obligations under human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. The initiative culminated in the production of the Montreux Document in 2008.78 
The Document is not a binding instrument but a mere statement of 
recommendations meant to bolster the state's ability to control PMSCs activity. From 
an ideological standpoint the Document was a major triumph for PMSCs because it 
signalled the international community's acceptance of private security operatives as 
legitimate players in the context of an armed conflict. For this reason PMSC 
organisations have been quick to welcome it. They have predicted that the 
Document will form the basis for developing an industry-wide code of conduct that 
will have a wider application than the existing self-regulatory mechanisms.79 
 
The Document has two parts. The first part contains 27 obligations that states have 
to assume with regards to their regulation of PMSCs. These obligations generally 
                                                 
77  Article 4(5) of the Draft Convention. 
78  The seventeen countries initially involved in the production of this document were: Afghanistan, 
Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States of America. In 
addition, a sizeable number of PMSCs and NGOs were also involved. See Juma 2011 Obiter 77. 
See also Cockayne 2009 JCSL 401. 
79  See Stürchler 2008 JIPO 10. 
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require that states ensure PMSCs' compliance with international law. They are 
therefore enjoined to enact appropriate legislations that are in conformity with 
international instruments; to create methods of enforcement of the law so enacted, 
including the investigation and prosecution of offenders; to ensure respect for 
international law; and to take responsibility for the activities of PMSCs they contract, 
including the readiness to provide reparations whenever necessary to parties who 
suffer as a result of PMSC activity. 
 
The second part contains what is referred to as good practices and is meant to 
"provide guidance and assistance to states in ensuring respect for international 
humanitarian law and human rights law" and to promote responsible conduct in 
states' relationship with PMCs operating in their territories. There are 73 good 
practises listed.80 But in all these, the prime responsibility rests with states. As far as 
contracting states are concerned, their responsibility for violations of humanitarian or 
human rights law by PMSCs will arise where the PMSC is incorporated in the regular 
armed force; where the PMSC is under the command of the state; where it is 
empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority, or to perform functions 
"normally" conducted by organs of state; and where the PMSC is acting under the 
instructions of the state.81 It is understandable that the drafters of the Document 
intended to clarify the confusion around state responsibility, but the manner in which 
the obligations are crafted may indeed be the greatest weakness of the instrument. 
Leaving responsibility on the shoulders of states may be counter-productive. For 
example, states with weaker legislations or those who delay in enacting appropriate 
laws will not be able to fully participate in the framework created by the Document. 
The result will be that PMSCs will move to such states to avoid strict oversight. Other 
states may have an interest in shielding PMSCs from public oversight because they 
perform sensitive duties. They may therefore enact laws that give immunity or 
restrict the disclosure of information to the public. (Incidentally, this loophole has 
been sealed by the Draft Convention). The Document should have given some 
recognition to civil society, especially in monitoring the accountability of PMSCs in 
                                                 
80  Stürchler 2008 JIPO 9. 
81  Paragraph 7 of Part 1 of the Montreux Document spells out this obligation in rather elaborate 
terms. 
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conflict situations, and established minimum standards that states must comply with, 
no matter what. 
 
4.4  Self-regulation 
 
Concomitant with the recent normative developments both at the United Nations 
and within the various formations working towards creating regulatory standards for 
PMSCs are the efforts by the industry to rid itself of the label of mercenarism and 
construct a new businesslike image for itself. Underlying these efforts is the 
considerable influence that the industry has been able to exert on policy formulation 
with regard to military activity in conflict zones. Part of their strength lie in their 
international presence82 and the fact that they find unrivalled favour with powerful 
governments in the north.83 But the industry has proceeded cautiously, first by 
recognising the validity of the misgivings about the conduct of its members and 
secondly, by proclaiming its willingness to enforce accountability through in-house 
procedures (self-regulation). Indeed, the message seems to be that self-regulation is 
possible because they are transparent, legal and have the capacity to regulate 
themselves. It is no secret that the main driving force is the desire to keep state-
directed regulatory and oversight schemes at a minimum. PMSCs are no different 
from other business entities in this regard. Most self-regulatory systems are born out 
of the need to pre-empt government regulations — what has been referred to as the 
"shadow hierarchy" argument.84 The bad publicity the PMSC industry got in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Africa have no doubt created a potential for the adoption of 
stringent regulatory controls by governments. But whether the publicity of events 
from these areas led to more cover-up as has been suggested by some scholars is a 
matter for debate.85 
 
                                                 
82  By 2008, PMSCs had a presence in over 110 countries. See Steinhoff "What are Mercenaries?" 
19.  
83  See generally Cockayne et al Beyond Market Forces 45; Bryton 2002 J Int Aff 303. 
84  See Nevers 2010 J Pub Pol'y 222. See also Prakash 1999 Business Strategy and the Environment 
323; Cashore, Auld and Newsom Governing Through Markets 27. 
85  See eg Singer Corporate Warrior 222. 
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In response, the industry has developed a full array of internal management systems 
and controls through cooperation. For example industry players who are members of 
the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), the International 
Peace Operations (IPOA), the Private Security Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI) 
and the newly formed Pan African Security Association (PASA), have developed 
systems of controls and even some binding Codes of Conduct. IPOA for example, 
which has a membership of over 40 companies, has a Code of Conduct that sets out 
the members' responsibility on human rights, transparency, arms, safety and work 
place relations.86 The organisation has a Standards Committee which is tasked with 
investigating any alleged infractions of the Code. However, the most stringent 
measure that the Committee may take against a member is to recommend 
expulsion. The BAPSC, on the other hand, require that its members provide service 
with "high professional skills and expertise whilst recognising that the countries 
where they are operating have inadequate frameworks."87 The organisation is heavy 
on the promotion of good relations between its members and the government of the 
UK and international bodies, and requires compliance with the values, interests and 
laws of the countries where they operate. 
 
Considering the gravity of the human rights violations that have been committed by 
some of these companies, such measures are laughable. Apart from being too 
permissive, the mechanisms are designed to achieve results only with the consent of 
the members. Moreover, not all companies operating in conflict zones are members 
of such associations. One analyst has described the self-regulation mechanisms as 
nothing more than statements on paper.88 The regrettable fact is that although the 
codes of conduct produced by these associations cannot override the obligations 
created by international human rights law and international Humanitarian law,89 the 
                                                 
86  Mesner "Working Towards Effective Legislation" 166. 
87  See BAPSC 2008 www.org.uk. One of the key objectives of the association is stated to be that of 
providing guidance on the substance of the need to comply with "international legal statutes". 
Obviously, with limited regulatory regimes at the international level, the association is aware that 
its members may be best served by the self-regulatory framework. 
88  Cockayne et al Beyond Market Forces 45-46. 
89  Gillard 2006 IRRC 548. 
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constituencies that subscribe to them are unlikely to support the establishment of a 
binding multilateral framework. 
 
5 Towards a new South African approach to PMSC regulation 
 
The discussions in the above paragraphs easily lead to the conclusion that the 
international community no longer regards PMSCs as mercenaries and that their 
deployment in conflict zones may become the norm rather than an exception. Also, 
that there is belief among many states that they can control the activities of PMSCs, 
especially their use of force, through national laws. These conclusions, however 
tenuous they might appear, represent a change in the way the world views PMSCs 
and privatisation in the security sector in general. Concurrent with this evolved 
thinking is the realisation that existing normative structures, especially those that 
hitherto informed the prohibitionist notions and anti-mercenary ideas, are generally 
impotent in the face of the challenges that the phenomenon now poses. Taking all of 
these things together, one could view the PMSC phenomenon as presenting 
challenges as well as opportunities — challenges because there is a need for greater 
accountability in the industry, and opportunities because states can now expand 
their security infrastructure in ways that enable them to participate in the global 
arena without political inhibitions. It is our view that a response to both the 
challenges and the opportunities should invoke normative changes sensitive to the 
newfound willingness to liberalise the security sector. 
 
The South African Defence Review 2012 is an indicator of this changed sensibility 
since the 1994 White Paper and the 1996 Defence Review were formulated. 
Although these earlier policies carry some deficit, such as a lack of clarity on the role 
of South African-based institutions in Africa's security architecture and the stunted 
progress of the non-offensive defence capabilities programme,90 they ensured that 
security reform remained high on the list of priorities of the post-apartheid 
government. The Defence Review 2012 has entered on this path, but with a lack of 
dogmatism that opens its reform agenda to new ideas. And that is why its 
                                                 
90  See Roux "Revision of the South African Defence Review" 283-284. 
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accommodative approach to PMSCs is a breath of fresh air, so to speak. The 
Defence Review now provides an opportunity to explore contemporary and diverging 
issues relating to private military security from a legal point of view. And in a rather 
overt way, it encourages the nation to ponder the possibility of putting in place a 
legislative framework dealing with PMSCs that takes on board all the imperatives of 
regulation consistent with the emerging sensibilities on security reform. In the 
following sections we attempt to justify this view and to suggest some broad 
imperatives that such legislation would cover if it were to be enacted. 
 
5.1 Justifying the establishment of a legislative framework 
 
South Africa was lauded for being the first African nation to enact a law on 
mercenaries — the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 2006.91 But as we have already shown, 
there are serious limitations in the Act's regulatory framework. Furthermore, like the 
related international treaties, it is of little practical use in relation to PMSCs. 
However, the fact that there is an existing legal framework is somewhat of a 
blessing in the sense that it allows for the interrogation of the effectiveness of the 
anti-mercenary law in the emerging context. The existence of this largely moribund 
law indicates a general willingness of South Africa's political elite to deal with the 
challenges that privatisation of security brings. Apart from the dearth of legal 
frameworks to deal with the challenges that the PMSC phenomenon pose, it may be 
equally important to register the broader economic benefits of establishing standards 
of regulation that do not necessarily stifle the economic enterprise. Obviously, 
adopting a more liberal approach to PMSCs may strategically position South Africa to 
take advantage of globalisation and its free-market system and to expand its 
presence in the global security industry.92 
 
                                                 
91  See eg Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 246. 
92  The use of PMSCs to deal with the menace of piracy off the coast of Somali demonstrates their 
increased presence in the international security debate, but also the fact that they generate 
economic benefits. See eg Spearin 2012 JICJ 823. 
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Primarily, however, establishing effective regulatory mechanisms engender the 
promulgation of a legislative regime that creates standards aimed at improving 
accountability for the industry. And as already mentioned, the task of instituting 
accountability cannot be left to international regulatory frameworks alone. The latter 
should be complemented by domestic interventions. And this is what justifies our call 
for legislative action at the national level. In our view, a domestic regulatory regime 
that can meet these challenges must be effectively capable of upholding universal 
standards of human rights law and international humanitarian law, while adapting to 
the emerging demands of the global security landscape. 
 
5.2 Elements of the envisioned regulatory framework 
 
We believe that time has come to establish a permissive, albeit effective regulatory 
framework for PMSCs in South Africa. The basis of doing this should be the 
recognition of PMSCs as legitimate actors in the security arena. This recognition is 
captured most succinctly by the discursive shift that we earlier alluded to, which has 
moved the discourse away from the anti-mercenary and prohibitionist approach to 
the regulatory one. This shift has exposed the normative loopholes in a potentially 
vast mine-field of concerns regarding these entities. While with mercenaries it was 
easy to simply prohibit, with PMSCs, legal standards of practice and responsibility for 
violations of human rights and rules of international humanitarian law have to be 
established. An effective and legitimate regulatory framework must therefore deal 
with a plethora of concerns, the most important of which are: the preliminary issue 
of defining these entities, determining their legal status both under international 
human rights law and humanitarian law, their obligations and responsibilities, and 
the nature and implications of the relationships between private military companies 
and state and non-state actors in either international or non-international armed 
conflict. These are matters that require normative certainty. Although an argument 
could be made that since the Defence Review merely encourages debate on these 
issues, a sectoral approach to regulation, such as we see in United States and other 
European countries, may suffice. We dispute this contention.  In the United States, 
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for example, there are over fifty laws that affect PMSCs.93 Since they address 
different issues, effective enforcement is difficult to attain. In our view, sectoral 
legislations are patchy and un-coordinated — they fail to "provide a comprehensive 
system of human rights standards".94 Also, achieving maximum protection for 
individuals or groups who suffer from violations of human rights or rules of 
international law and enforcing such rules may be cumbersome. Given these 
drawbacks it may be appropriate to conclude that the Defence Review 2012 
envisions the promulgation of a single legislative framework establishing key 
regulatory measures for PMSCs, from which other regimes may derive their 
legitimacy. 
 
Setting out precise and conclusive content of the proposed law is not our intention. 
The objective here is to analyse some broad aspects of the law with a view to 
showing how its regime could fit within the framework of change we alluded to 
earlier — the change from prohibition to regulation. One of the main factors that 
have propelled the transition is the affirmation of the status of PMSCs as essentially 
civilian and not military. This is key to defining the scope of the new law's 
jurisdiction. Correlative to the issue of status is the nature of the services that PMSCs 
could be lawfully contracted to perform. This has been something of a grey area, 
where actual practice conflicts with the intentions of law. The Montreux Document, 
for example, describes them as companies that offer "military and security services", 
thus conflating their roles.95 Such an inclusive description of services that PMSCs 
could offer is problematic for a national regulatory framework and should be 
avoided. The conflation might render it difficult to establish the necessary distinction 
between PMSCs and mercenaries, and the status of PMSC personnel under 
international humanitarian law.96 Further, it might compromise efforts to create a 
regulatory scheme that may be seen as compatible with the existing anti-mercenary 
                                                 
93  See Hurst 2010 S Cal L Rev 470. 
94  Hurst 2010 S Cal L Rev 470. 
95  Montreux Document para 9. 
96  Whether PMSCs can be classified as "combatants" or "civilians" under international humanitarian 
law depends on the kinds of services that they provide in a conflict situation. And this has been 
very controversial. See Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 77. The new law could lessen the confusion 
if it limits the roles of PMSCs to purely civilian functions, although this may not be easy to attain. 
See Gumedze Addressing the Use of Private Security 3. 
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law. Moreover, if the state is to retain its monopoly of force, crucial military activities 
must not be outsourced but be left within the domain of civic responsibility. It should 
be remembered that part of the reason why some scholars have been sceptical 
about privatisation is that it allows for all manner of individuals and groups to get 
access to military capabilities through the open market.97 The new law must allay 
these fears by establishing a tight regime that limits PMSCs to acceptable support 
roles that do not compromise the state's monopoly of the use of force and diminish 
the responsibilities that go with it.98 In this regard, the proposed law could avoid the 
omnibus prohibition based on "security services" and "non-security services" 
envisaged by the South African Mercenary Act99 and delineate functions along the 
same lines as the Draft Convention, by prohibiting PMSCs from performing functions 
that are "inherently governmental".100 
 
What then are the important elements that should be canvassed by this law? Key 
issues that immediately come to mind are standards of accountability for violations 
as mentioned, access to judicial remedies for violations committed by PMSC 
personnel, and administrative imperatives such as licensing and monitoring. As 
stated above, the standards of accountability should form the core of the new law. 
And South Africa does not need to re-invent the wheel but could borrow the design 
from existing templates. This immediately raises the question of how the new law 
should relate to other legal frameworks, codes of conduct and soft-law instruments, 
such as the Montreux Document. One thing that must be borne in mind is that there 
                                                 
97  See eg Singer Corporate Warrior 7. 
98  Some scholars have suggested that the reason why states hire PMSCs is to avoid responsibility or 
circumvent national law. See Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 77. 
99  South Africa’s Mercenary Act, s 1(1) defines "security service" to include " (a) Protection or 
safeguarding of an individual, personnel or property in any manner; (b) giving advice on the 
protection or safeguarding of individuals or property; (c) giving advice on the use of security 
equipment; (d) providing a reactive or response service in connection with the safeguarding of 
persons or property in any manner; (e) providing security training or instruction to a security 
service provider or prospective security service provider; (f) installing, servicing or repairing 
security equipment; (g) monitoring signals or transmissions from security equipment; (h) making 
a person or service of a person available, directly or indirectly, for the rendering of any service 
referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g)\ or (i) managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of 
any of the services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (h)". 
100  Article 2 of the Draft Convention (functions which are "inherently governmental" include "direct 
participation in hostilities, waging war and or combat operations, taking prisoners, law 
making…and other functions that a state party may consider to be inherently state functions"). 
See a discussion of the Draft Convention in Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 182. 
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is much inconsistency in the codes and the soft-law instruments. Our suggestion is 
that South African law could benefit more if it positioned itself as an extension of the 
Draft Convention. In this regard, the new law could, for example, adopt the Draft 
Convention's construction of the law on responsibility that arises from the use of 
force;101 its scheme for the protection of the victims of violations;102 and the 
elevation of the role of INGOs.103 Overall, the proposed law must establish minimum 
standards based on principles of human rights and international humanitarian law 
that is applicable to all PMSCs registered in South Africa. Any association that may 
wish to enact a code of conduct for its members will then have to ensure that its 
code conforms to uniform standards in the new law. Another aspect that the law 
should absorb in its enforcement scheme is criminal liability. We propose that the 
law should establish such liability for certain kinds of activities within the operational 
mandate of PMSCs. Such liability could be linked to domestic and international 
criminal justice systems. The element of universal jurisdiction must of necessity be 
incorporated so that PMSCs cannot escape liability by simply migrating into South 
Africa. A detailed discussion of the protective and criminal schemes envisaged here 
may be appropriate for another space. Below, we digest some of the key 
administrative imperatives that the new law could incorporate in its regulatory 
regime to give effect to the standards of accountability that it establishes. 
 
5.2.1 A regulatory body 
 
Several frameworks discussed earlier have encouraged states to establish national 
institutions responsible for monitoring PMSCs. For example, the Draft Convention 
enjoins states to create a governmental body that would act as "national centre for 
collection, analysis and exchange of information" on the activities of PMSCs.104 It 
does not indicate the kinds of structures that such a body should have, presumably 
leaving it to states to model their legislation in the form that suits their 
circumstances. South Africa's Mercenary Act did not establish any such body, but 
                                                 
101  Article 8 of the Draft Convention. 
102  Article 20 of the Draft Convention. 
103  Article 3 of the Draft Convention. 
104  Article 13(1)(b) of the Draft Convention. 
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bestowed all functions to the National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
(NCACC) established under the National Conventional Arms Control Act 2002. It is 
still unknown how the NCACC could have been effective, because the rules of 
procedure have not been promulgated. The new law that we are proposing could 
create an opportunity to establish a robust institution that will carry out all the 
licensing and monitoring functions for PMSCs, and provide a focal point for PMSC 
regulation. African countries, though not entirely opposed to establishing similar 
legislative frameworks, have been slow to enact legislations of this kind. One 
example that South Africa could look at is the Sierra Leonean's National Security and 
Central intelligence Act passed in 2002.105 The Act created the Office of National 
Security (ONS), which is the pivotal organ for the regulation of all private security 
operatives.106 Apart from being the secretariat for all activities mandated by the Act, 
the ONS is responsible for licensing of all PMSCs in accordance with set regulations, 
and ensuring that PMSCs comply with the Standard Operating Manual for Private 
Security Companies (SOP) promulgated in 2006.107 The Sierra Leonean law 
demonstrates that it is possible for states to tailor their institutional arrangements to 
match their particular circumstances. 
 
5.2.2 Registration and licensing 
 
Registration and licensing are perhaps the most effective ways of monitoring PMSCs 
activities within the domestic setting. A licensing and registration regime must 
enable the enforcement of standards. It should therefore be proactive rather than 
reactive. One aspect of PMSC operations that such a regime would eliminate is 
opaqueness and secrecy. Currently, information about their operations, personnel 
                                                 
105  Other bodies that the Act establishes are the National Security Council (NSC) (chaired by the 
President), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Force (RSLAF). 
See Conteh "Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone" 9. 
106  See Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 202. 
107  The SOP sets out guidelines for the issuance of licences, which include minimum wage 
requirements for personnel, the ownership of sufficient and up-to-date equipment, the training 
of personnel in international humanitarian law, human and civil rights, and gender-based 
violence (SOP 5). It also contains guidelines on complaint procedures, especially those that are 
labour related. See Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 202. 
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welfare or even deaths is very scant.108 A transparent licensing system would lessen 
the secrecy about their affairs, and at a very practical level, prohibit PMSCs that are 
not registered and accredited through a public process from operating in or from 
South Africa. Before registration the company might be required to fulfil a set of 
criteria based on standards established by the law. By registering the company 
would be submitting itself to a regulatory regime with constant checks on its 
operations. Registered companies would then be required to regularly supply 
information about their operations, including the expertise of their personnel and the 
training they perform on issues related to human rights and international 
humanitarian law, and would be required to submit to regional auditing. The 
legislation must ensure that there will be consequences for non-compliance. A wide 
range of sanctions could be considered, including blacklisting and deregistration, all 
of which would affect their business. PMSCs will pay attention to the national 
regulatory framework only if it affects their marketability. 
 
In designing the registration and licensing framework the new law must take into 
account international imperatives that are likely to impact on the domestic law. For 
example, the licensing regime established by the Draft Convention extends beyond 
the mere authorisation of PMSCs to do business in the territory of a state party. As 
noted elsewhere, "the process must ensure that PMSCs record for human rights 
violations and other violations of international law are examined and that the due 
diligence standards are met".109 In addition, the Draft Convention sets out a broad 
licensing regime that extend beyond the home state. It requires that home states 
should establish licensing procedures for PMSCs hoping to export their services 
abroad.110 This requirement is galvanised by article 15, which enjoin states to ensure 
that the export of military and security services occurs in compliance with 
appropriate licensing procedures. The Draft Convention also requires that home as 
well as host states share information regarding PMSCs.111 The proposed law could 
align itself to these requirements and set the benchmark for cooperation even 
                                                 
108  Percy Regulating the Private Security Industry 21. 
109  Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 203. 
110  Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 203. 
111  Juma 2011 Law Democracy & Development 203. 
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among the SADC states. If the new law could require that PMSCs coming from other 
countries must give proof of their registration before they can operate in South 
Africa, and if it also makes allowance for the state to share its registration register 
with other countries, then the ambit of its regulatory framework could be widened. 
 
5.2.3 Judicial enforcement 
 
South Africa is developing a strong culture of constitutional litigation primarily based 
on the articulation of rights. It is conceivable that a regulatory framework that 
contains standards framed in the language of rights will be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. Thus, it is imperative that the new law adopts a viable framework for 
corporate activity and human rights. Since PMSCs are basically corporate entities, 
norms that affect their operations should conform to international standards which, 
according to a Human Rights Council report prepared by John Ruggie, revolve 
around three principles: the state's duty to protect citizens against human rights 
abuse by third parties, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the 
need for effective access to remedies.112These principles have been discussed 
exhaustively in many studies and we shall not repeat them here.113 However, we 
wish to highlight the question of access to remedies that we believe is crucial to 
PMSC regulation. In the first place we believe that the new law should create 
multiple avenues for seeking redress against violations. There should be a procedure 
through which the regulatory body discussed above can investigate violations and 
consider individual complaints. Mechanisms through which members of the public 
can bring complaints are numerous in the international realm and the drafters of the 
new law have ample precedents to consider. It might be useful if the proposed law 
had universal jurisdiction as well, so that no matter where the PMSCs operate, 
complaints can still be brought against them in South Africa. Similarly, latitude for 
lodging complaints with other human rights bodies such as the South African Human 
Rights Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
                                                 
112  See HRC 2008. 
113  These principles are also outlined in ECOSOC 2003. See also Mehra 2009-2010 Pac McGeorge 
Global Bus & Dev LJ 329 
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should exist. Such a procedure should be accessible, simple and effective, and not 
overburdened by technicalities and bureaucracy. 
 
These apart, the administrative process should not in any way inhibit the rights of 
access to court under section 34 of the Constitution. In our view effective judicial 
enforcement is a prerequisite for any meaningful regulatory regime. Thus, legislation 
must guarantee access to the court and not merely confine resolution of disputes to 
the administrative organs. Courts are the ultimate arbiters of disputes. This role 
should never be sidestepped even when the standards sought to be enforced have 
international implications. Moreover, domestic judicial mechanisms are crucial for 
achieving maximum compliance with regulatory standards for PMSCs. Several things 
work in favour of South Africa in this regard. To mention a few, its judicial structure 
functions better than can be said of most other African states. Secondly, its 
constitution lays a firm foundation for the application of international law in domestic 
courts. Thirdly, it has domesticated a number of international treaties that have a 
bearing on PMSC activities. For example, it has adopted the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court into domestic law, thus limiting the scope for PMSC 
personnel who are suspected of having committed international crimes from 




The failure of South Africa to streamline its private security sector by establishing a 
tight regulatory framework for PMSCs threatens to have repercussions far beyond its 
borders. This is poised to change if the policy direction encapsulated in the Defence 
Review culminates in a normative regime. Broadly speaking, the Defence Review has 
provided a platform for the debates on South Africa's preparedness to address 
security threats facing Africa and its commitment to continental security. Specifically, 
however, it has created a unique opportunity for South Africans to consider 
establishing an appropriate regulatory framework for private military and security 
                                                 
114  Rome Statute of International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. See also Du Plessis 2008 
www.iss.co.za. 
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companies that operate on or from its soil. And this can be achieved only through 
legislative intervention. We have suggested that such an intervention must aim at 
harmonising the domestic framework with international trends whilst being guided 
by the need to make its approach congruent with South Africa's growing regional 
and continental responsibilities. Notwithstanding, we are equally conscious of the 
fact that serial defects in South Africa's security infrastructure cannot be cured by a 
single legislative feat. There are many other variables that must be considered, and 
while South Africa struggles to harness all possible strategies for reform of the 
sector, it could begin by streamlining its approach to privatisation and taking 
advantage of the PMSC phenomenon. A new normative regime for the regulation of 
PMSCs that conforms to the standards of international law, human rights and 
international humanitarian law is probably the best way forward. 
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